After reading this I'm starting to think you haven't really comprehended quantum theory when you thought you did. You are no better than a creationist arguing against evolution when you say things like empty buildings can't burn down if the uncertainty principle is true. While Jabok is saying that it is true because of the double slit experiment, you are saying it isn't because it sounds too crazy. Like your example with Schod.'s Cat, the mind boggling possibility that the cat could be both dead and alive does not make it any less true. Here is a very simple(somewhat kiddie) video that explains it just to make sure we are all on the same page (and to catch anyone else reading along up that didn't have the will to read through Jabok's wall of text)
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=DfPeprQ7oGcI understand it fine, CAFG, and I'll say again: I'm not refuting the results of the physical experiments. What I'm saying is that while the uncertainty principle is a useful tool for performing calculations and theorizing, it does not actually reflect reality. I am of the same opinion as Einstein: quantum physics is an incomplete physical model, just as classical mechanics was an incomplete physical model. I don't plan on simply reiterating what I've been saying all along however except in this post and that only to hopefully explain as clear as I can what my point is, CAFG.
The comparison to a creationist is silly. What I believe you meant to compare me to was the stereotype of a closed-minded christian who is blind and unwilling to accept the truth despite anything he/she is told because it may conflict with their faith, an that's a low blow man, that hurts. Fortunately in this respect I am not hindered by any faith or desire for things to be a certain way; I know reality will be real whether or not I want it to be, so the comparison is faulty: I'm simply calling it as I see it. Nor am I saying the model isn't true because it "sounds too crazy." I'm saying the model isn't true because it fails to conform to the principles of physics we have observed elsewhere. Take for example, the "observer" force. No one has really defined it, all we really know is that when we measure which slit the electron is going through, it acts differently. In essence, we know the effect, but not the cause, the what but not the why. This is why I doubt the theory. If some physicist comes out with precise data and a solid theory on how it works, of course I would accept it, but such is not the case right now.
Here's another quote from the EPR paper that reflects my viewpoint:
Any serious consideration of a physical theory must take into account the distinction between the objective reality, which is independant of any theory, and the physical concepts with which the theory operates. These concepts are intended to correspond with the objective reality, and by means of these concepts we picture this reality to ourselves.
I acknowledge that I could be wrong. The theory could truly reflect the objective reality, but until more evidence is presented the case seems weak to me. Perhaps on the other hand the simple thought experiments I propose wouldn't be enough to destroy a theory, but in this "case" the burden of proof lies upon the supporters of the theory (unless of course no other theory exists), so I see my points as valid. That is to say, if they are going to establish the uncertainty principle as absolute truth, then they had better have an absolute proof (or at least reasonably close to absolute, I figure 99% would be fair, somewhere in that ballpark, you get the idea). I've never seen an apple fall up, you know? Nor have I seen an object in many states at once; though I realize the probability of seeing that is approximately zero.
Relating back to the topic at hand however, if these probabilities of affecting real-life actions are truly insignifigant, then how does quantum theory have any affect on determinism and free will? It was mentioned that the electrons in the brain would all fire off in different positions, but if the probability of them firing a different way in the same scenario is so small that it essentially won't happen, then things pretty much remain determined. Granted, it wouldn't be true determinism, but such infinitesimally small probabilities of things occurring a separate way really isn't much different from things being exactly determined, and the majority of folks wouldn't have free will anyway. With a simple example, let's say bob likes apples and oranges according to Apple(50.1), Orange(49.9). By some magic power we have the ability to perfectly replicate a situation where we have the same exact bob choosing to eat an apple or an orange. Now, the first time bob picks the apple, based on the firing of electrons in his brain making a decision in a certain manner. However, the second time, if the effect that the uncertainty principle when taken at the macro level is less than .1% of the decision, (and many of these probabilities are ridiculously small I'd imagine at the quantum level of affecting a large object), bob will still choose the apple every time, and as such the same outcome will occur every time, with possible, but probably negligible, exception. In this way, he really wouldn't have "free will" anyway.
None.