No, because humans wouldn't know whether it was good or not unless God commanded it, and he knows that it is good, so he commands us, I don't see how that is circular, it just gives both answers.
Ok, seeing as how you STILL haven't answered my question with one option or the other, I'll have to go on inference. I think you are saying it is good because god commands it. If so, then... (and this is beside the points that you're using completely circular arguements)
"This scenario is essentially moral relativism writ large; it says that morality is determined solely by God's whims. So far, God has declared justice and mercy and other such things to be good. But tomorrow, he might change his mind and declare rape, torture and child sacrifice to be good, and from that point on, we would have to praise that choice and live with its repercussions. People who did such things would be welcomed into the bosoms of the angels, while those who refused would go to Hell. Can anyone, even the most conservative of fundamentalist believers, condone such a scenario?
Some believers might say that God would not command such things. But why would he not, under this view? If there is no external standard, then there is no reason why God would declare one thing good and not another. Whatever God willed would by definition be good. Under this scenario, theistic morality is completely arbitrary, and would have no objective basis.
There is another problem with the second solution to the Euthyphro dilemma: namely, it would make it a meaningless tautology to say that God is good. If goodness is defined as whatever God does, then to say "God is good" would reduce to "God does whatever he does", or more succinctly, "God is God". Under this view, to praise God for his goodness would just be a way of praising him for being the most powerful and doing whatever he wants - it is saying that might automatically makes right. To say that God is good and have that statement mean something - for that proposition to impart any additional information - there must be an independent standard, one not determined by God, against which God can be compared and contrasted, and we return to the first fork of the Euthyphro dilemma."
"If we choose the first option (god commands it because it is good), then we are saying that there is a moral standard external to God, and that is this standard, and not God himself, that determines what is good; God would simply be relaying this information to us. Needless to say, this presents problems for theists. What is this standard, where did it come from, and how does it get its power over God? If God is constrained by a standard external to himself, then he cannot be said to be omnipotent. And if such a standard exists, could not atheists bypass God and appeal to the standard directly?"
Those quotes can be found
Here
None.